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Various kinds of observations show that the ability of human beings to both consciously
relive past events – episodicmemory – and conceive future events, entails an activeprocess
of construction. This construction process also underpins many other important aspects
of conscious human life, such as perceptions, language, and conscious thinking. This
article provides an explanation of what makes the constructive process possible and how
it works.The process mainly relies on attentional activity, which has a discrete and periodic
nature, and working memory, which allows for the combination of discrete attentional
operations. An explanation is also provided of how past and future events are constructed.
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INTRODUCTION
Tulving (1972) noted that one of the most fascinating achieve-
ments of the human mind is its ability to mentally travel through
time. We can relive experiences by thinking back to situations that
occurred in the past; likewise, we can mentally project ourselves
into the anticipated future through our imagination, daydreams
and fantasies.
Time travel is just one of the main forms that consciousness can
assume. As phenomenologists have shown (Gallagher and Zahavi,
2008), there are various modes of givenness of objects and events,
that is, ways in which objects and events appear to us. It is possible
for one and the same object or event to appear in a variety of
other different ways: from this or that perspective, linguistically
represented, dreamt, imagined, perceived, wished for, or feared.
Each of these forms of consciousness possesses its own
phenomenal quality: perceiving an object feels different from
imagining the same object, which in turn feels different from
remembering it. Despite the phenomenal differences, it can be
shown that most of these various forms of consciousness depend
on constructive processes based on some common mechanisms.
This is suggested for example by the observation that they can be
“added” to every conscious content, in the sense that the same
conscious content can be experienced in one or the other form of
consciousness by means of just mentally processing it through one
or the other form of consciousness (for example, we can experi-
ence the same event as occurring either in the past or future by
means of just mentally adding to it the temporal dimension of past
or future, respectively, Nyberg et al., 2010).
In this article I will provide psychological and neurophysiolog-
ical data to substantiate the idea that some of the most important
forms of consciousness – episodic memory, episodic future
thought, perception, language, and conscious thinking – are based
on constructive processes based on two common mechanisms:
attention and working memory. The sections Time travel and
Perception, language and conscious thinking will provide evidence
supporting the general idea that these forms of consciousness are
the result of an active process of construction performed by the
subject. In the section The underlying mechanisms of constructive
processes: attention and working memory I will try to show that the
constructive processes underpinning the various forms of con-
sciousness, rely on two common and fundamental mechanisms:
attention andworkingmemory. Finally, the sectionVariously using
attention and working memory yields various construction processes
will show how constructive processes can yield various forms
of consciousness in general, and speciﬁcally how the conscious
experience of temporality is constructed.
TIME TRAVEL
EPISODIC MEMORY
Episodic memory – the ability to consciously relive personal
past events (Tulving, 1985) – is an active process of construc-
tion, rather than a faithful re-enactment of the past (Rosenﬁeld,
1988; Suddendorf et al., 2009). Various kinds of observations show
this.
As Schacter (1999) has shown, memory generally suffers from
different types of “sins,” which can be classiﬁed into three main
categories. The ﬁrst category involves forgetting: memory of facts
and events typically becomes less accessible over time, even when
we deliberately search our memory in an attempt to recall a spe-
ciﬁc fact or event; memory of facts and events is affected by
attention: when insufﬁcient attention is paid to a stimulus at
the time of encoding or retrieval, forgetting is likely to occur, as
the phenomenon of change blindness shows (Simons and Levin,
1997); even when a fact or event has been deeply encoded, and
has not been lost over time, it may occasionally be temporarily
inaccessible (one of the most common and frequent instances is
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the tip-of-the-tongue state). The second category involves dis-
tortion or inaccuracy: even if people may remember correctly a
fact from a past experience, they can misattribute it to a wrong
source; suggestions or misleading questions that are made when
one is attempting to recall an experience, may alter the recollec-
tion of the original event; memories can be biased and distorted
by expectations, beliefs, current knowledge, etc. The third cate-
gory refers to pathological remembrances: facts and events, such
as traumatic events, thatwe cannot forget even if wewishwe could.
While, on the one hand, these “sins” demonstrate the occurrence
of memory distortions, on the other hand, they clearly support
the idea that memory is not so much a literal replay of the past
as a complex process of assembling and integrating several bits of
information.
Moreover, as Tulving (1972) already noted, different mem-
ory systems differ in their susceptibility to transform and lose
stored information, which further complicates the picture drawn
by Schachter. For example, forgetting appears to be more read-
ily produced in episodic memory than in semantic memory.
Since information in the former is always temporally dated, and
can only be retrieved if the retrieval cue accurately speciﬁes its
temporal date, interference with temporal coding may render
access to it difﬁcult or impossible. On the contrary, informa-
tion in semantic memory, being usually encoded as part of a rich
multidimensional structure of concepts and their relations, is bet-
ter protected by such embeddedness from interference by other
inputs.
The phenomenon of déjà-vu, in which we have the experi-
ence of reliving a past event in the absence of an actual memory,
shows that the sense of “pastness” of the event is not inherent
in the memory itself and that it depends on a process of active
construction.
Conversely, merely using a memory representation of a prior
event is not sufﬁcient to ensure the subjective experience of
remembering it: as Suddendorf et al. (2009) notice, semantic
memory allows us to know where and when we were born but
this does not sufﬁce to consciously relive that moment.
EPISODIC FUTURE THOUGHT
Episodic future thought is the ability to simulate speciﬁc personal
episodes that may potentially occur in the future (Szpunar, 2010).
In many cases, it is patent that episodic future thought involves a
process of active construction of events that have not yet occurred,
such as when future thought depends on a (novel) recombi-
nation of episodic details (whether of perceptual or imaginal
source) into a hypothetical event. This is what experiments per-
formed using the word-cueing paradigm (Galton, 1880; Crovitz
and Schiffman, 1974) generally reveal: when participants are given
a word cue and are asked to use it to mentally generate personal
future details, they tend to imagine themselves in the context of
familiar settings and people (D’Argembeau and Van der Linden,
2004).
It shouldbenoted, however, that not always does future thought
depend on a recombination of episodic details. Sometimes, future
thoughts and episodes may be constructed without the need to
necessarily rely on the contents of speciﬁc episodic memory per
se: a general, abstract knowledge of the context, environment or
situation is sufﬁcient to imagine how things can evolve in future
(Szpunar, 2010).
The constructive process involved in episodic future thought is
highlighted by experiments such as Nyberg et al.’s (2010). Nyberg
et al. (2010) scanned well-trained subjects using fMRI during
experimental tasks that require the capacity to be aware of subjec-
tive time (chronesthesia), such as remembering a recent short walk
along a familiar route or imagining a future short walk along the
same route. Brain activity during these tasks was compared with
activity during a matched task that does not require chronesthe-
sia: the subjects were instructed to take a mental walk through
the same route in the present moment, without any thoughts
about speciﬁc personal past or future happenings. By contrast-
ing the remembering and imagining tasks with the mental walk
task, Nyberg et al. (2010) could measure brain activity correlated
with “pure” conscious states of different moments of subjective
time. They reported that the left lateral parietal cortex, as well as
the left frontal cortex, cerebellum, and thalamus were preferen-
tially engaged as the subjects thought about taking walks in the
past or future as compared to taking the same walk in the present
moment.
This study, while revealing which brain regions are speciﬁ-
cally related to the capacity to be aware of subjective time, also
clearly shows that an event (such as taking a short walk from
a certain point to another) can alternatively be experienced as
occurring in the past or future by means of just mentally adding
to it the temporal dimension of past or future, respectively. That
is, an event that is otherwise lived as present may become a past
or future event if we actively construct it as such, by mentally
adding to it a speciﬁc past or future temporal quality. (Inci-
dentally, it should be noted that I use the term “construction”
here in a wider sense than; Nyberg et al., 2010. While they use
it to refer to the sole process of constructing the scene of walk-
ing, my usage also includes the process of adding a temporal
dimension, and hence of constructing the subjective experience
of time).
That subjective time requires to be mentally constructed in
order to be consciously experienced, is further evidenced by all
those processes that, despite dealing with future events, can take
place independently from being experienced as occurring in time.
For example, Kwan et al.’s (2012) study shows a clear dissociation
between imagining and knowing about the future. K. C., a person
with episodic amnesia and unable to imagine future experiences,
can still value future reward and make a decision about the future
in a way comparable to healthy subjects, despite being unable to
construct the details of either past or future events. Therefore, the
ability to make decisions about the future is dissociable from the
ability to imagine one’s possible future. It should be noted that
the decision-making strategy of healthy individuals – like those
of the controls in Kwan et al.’s (2012) study – usually involves
future-oriented imagery (see also Peters and Büchel, 2010, who
show how the ability to imagine one’s possible future modulates
future decision-making). This is additional evidence that humans
can add a temporal dimension to a process that otherwise occurs
outside of any temporal experience.
Another case in which the capacity to deal with future events
does not necessarily depend on the capacity to simulate or imagine
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future events is anticipatory behavior. As observed by Suddendorf
and Corballis (1997), instincts, such as hibernation, provide a
mechanism for dealing with environmental changes without the
need for the organism to actually imagine the future (hibernators
prepare for winter even if they have not experienced that sea-
son before). This parallels the distinction between episodic and
other memory systems, which explains how the past can inﬂuence
behavior without necessarily involving mental time travel into the
past.
To summarize, both episodic memory and episodic future
thought are best conceived as constructive processes, rather than
literal records of the past or a projection in the future of care-
fully represented episodic memories, respectively. This common
characteristic is further highlighted by research ﬁndings from neu-
roimaging, neuropsychology, and clinical psychology that have
shown a close relationship between episodic memory and episodic
future thought: (a) neural regions believed to underlie the retrieval
of personal memories are similarly engaged by episodic future
thoughts; (b) damage to these regions is associated with impair-
ments of both remembering and episodic future thought; (c)
patients characterized by poor episodic memory exhibit a con-
current inability to imagine their future in a vivid way (for a
review, see Szpunar, 2010; however, it should be noted that differ-
ences between the two processes exist as well: see Schacter et al.,
2012).
PERCEPTION, LANGUAGE, AND CONSCIOUS THINKING
Episodic memory and episodic future thought are not the only
forms of human consciousness based on an active construction
process. Construction processes also underlie many other impor-
tant forms of human conscious life, such as perceptions, language,
and conscious thinking.
PERCEPTION
Just as memories are not a faithful re-enactment of the past, so
too perceptions are not a faithful representation of a world spec-
iﬁed prior to, and independently of, the activity of the subject.
Daily experiences and perceptual illusions show how situational
and contextual factors, as well as expectations, education and emo-
tions, shape our perceptions. If we consider the perception of space
alone, we see that different sense-organs generate different spatial
perceptions of the same object: a piece of rosemary stuck in a tooth
feels enormous until it is felt with your ﬁngers. Likewise, emotions
change our perception of space: in despair, for example, there is
nowhere to go, the sky closes in, actions seem pointless, and the
ordinary depths of the world are transformed (Morris, 2004). The
perception of the dimension of the same object changes in relation
to the different context in which it is placed: a piece of furniture
may seem smaller when seen in a shop than when seen inside our
house. Finally, the perception of space also changes with age: what
seemed to be big, large and high in size when we were children
(for example, the house in which we were born) may appear to be
small, narrow and low as adults.
These examples clearly show that perceptions are not a pas-
sive duplication of a ready-made world, but the result of an
active process of construction performed by the subject. Evi-
dence of this process of construction is provided by various kinds
of ﬁndings. Neural data show that the complex representations
generated by the visual system are built out of distinct streams
of processing: an occipitotemporal ventral stream in which cells
are sensitive to information pertaining to the identity of objects
and an occipitoparietal dorsal stream in which cells are sensitive
to spatial information (Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982). Within
each of these streams, information diverges further: there are
distinct streams for processing color, shape and motion, and
multiple representations of space within the posterior parietal cor-
tex. Moreover, activity in the visual system can be modulated by
attention (Treue, 2001; Boynton, 2005; Carrasco, 2011), which
allows the organism to adequately cope with contextually and
behaviorally relevant information.
Psychological phenomena such as the continuouswagon-wheel
illusion (VanRullen and Koch, 2003; Simpson et al., 2005; Van-
Rullen et al., 2005, 2006), perceived causality (Shallice, 1964) and
apparent simultaneity (Hirsh and Sherrick, 1961) and neurophys-
iological observations (Fingelkurts et al., 2010) reveal that our
experience of the surrounding world as a continuous, seamless
ﬂow of information, is actually the result of the combination
and assembly of distinct processing epochs. Studies on the phe-
nomenology of temporal perception of events (Pöppel, 1997,2004;
Wittmann, 2011) show that one can identify at least three differ-
ent levels at which successive events are fused to form distinct
subjective experiences, each possessing its own speciﬁc qualita-
tive characteristics. According to Wittmann (2011), on a ﬁrst,
basic level there is the “functional moment,” an elementary tem-
poral building block of perception in the range of milliseconds,
which has no perceivable duration because individual events are
processed as co-temporal and the temporal order of events is
not detected. On a second level, successive functional moments
are grouped on a time scale of up to around 3 s, yielding the
“experienced moment,” where events are perceived as occurring
in an extended now. Within the experienced moment, successive
events are strongly and orderly bound together: when listening
to a metronome at moderate speed, we do not hear so much a
train of individual beats, as perceptual gestalts having an accent
on every nth beat, such as “1–2, 1–2” or “1–2–3, 1–2–3.” If,
on the contrary, the metronome is too fast, we experience a
fast train of beats that does not contain any temporally ordered
structure of distinct events. Likewise, if the metronome is too
slow, we perceive only individual beats which are not related
to each other. A third level of integration exceeding about 3 s
leads to “mental presence,” a sequence of experienced moments
enclosed within the temporal window of a uniﬁed experience
of presence, which enables the continuous awareness of one-
self as presently perceiving and acting within an environment
(Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts, 2014). In sum,whereas the duration
of the functional moment is not perceived at all, an experienced
moment is perceived as happening now, for a short but extended
moment. On the contrary, mental presence involves the experi-
ence of a perceiving and feeling agent within a window of extended
present.
Despite the fact that we experience the world surrounding us as
a continuous, seamless ﬂow of information, as we do when watch-
ing amovie,we actually extract and process information in distinct
moments, similar to the snapshots of a camera. This observation
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is supported by empirical ﬁndings. For example, Latour (1967)
found that the visual threshold for detecting a ﬂash of light varied
periodically in the few milliseconds preceding the onset of an eye
saccade, and that the visual threshold for detecting two ﬂashes
displayed successively varied periodically as a function of the time
interval between them. This data can be interpreted as evidence
of periodical processing on the grounds that the probability of
detecting a brief stimulus varies as a function of the state of the
process: during a “no-processing” state, the detection rate of the
stimulus decreases, whereas it increases during the “processing”
state. Periodicities were also observed in reaction time distribu-
tions (Venables, 1960; Dehaene, 1993), which can be explained
in the following way: a stimulus with an onset occurring dur-
ing a “no processing” state must wait until the next processing
state in order to be processed, which leads to a longer reaction
time.
In a face identiﬁcation task, Blais et al. (2013) modulated
the signal-to-noise ratio of faces through time, so that at some
moments visual information was available, whereas at other
moments no information was available, and analyzed how dif-
ferent temporal proﬁles of signal-to-noise ratio impacted face
identiﬁcation performance. The aim was to test the hypothesis
that visual informationwould be sampled periodically. The under-
lying assumption was that if the information useful for the task
is available at the right moment, the participant is more likely
to respond correctly. In contrast, if the information useful for
the task is not available at the right moment during the pro-
cessing, then the participant is less likely to respond correctly.
The results of Blais et al.’s (2013) experiments show the exis-
tence of a discrete sampling of visual processing, operating at
a rate of about 10–15 Hz. Moreover, their ﬁndings support the
view that this periodical mechanism synchronizes with the visual
stimulation.
Data from electrophysiological recordings show that electri-
cal neural oscillations could provide the physiological basis of
periodic perceptual phenomena. Varela et al. (1981) found a close
correlation between the perception of apparent simultaneity and
the alpha phase at which stimuli are presented: two ﬂashes of
light that always have the same stimulus onset asynchrony are
judged to be simultaneous when presented at one particular phase,
but sequential when presented at the opposite phase. Busch et al.
(2009) and Mathewson et al. (2009) show that the phase of ongo-
ing oscillations inﬂuence whether a stimulus is perceived at all,
which indicates that the visual detection threshold is not con-
stant over time but ﬂuctuates along with the phase of spontaneous
electroencephalogram (EEG) oscillations. Drewes and VanRullen
(2011) show that the prestimulus oscillatory phase modulates
human saccadic reaction time. Investigating the role of pres-
timulus phase coupling on visual perception in an attentional
blink paradigm, Kranczioch et al. (2007) found that low levels
of prestimulus alpha phase coupling predict correct perception
of the second target stimulus, whereas high levels of prestimulus
alpha phase coupling predict a miss of the second target stim-
ulus. Doesburg et al. (2009) showed that perceptual switching
during binocular rivalry is time-locked to gamma-band synchro-
nizations which recur at a theta rate, indicating that the onset of
new conscious percepts coincides with the emergence of a new
gamma-synchronous assembly that is locked to an ongoing theta
rhythm. Doesburg et al. (2009, ibid., p. 2) infer that “only one
truly discrete perceptual experience may exist within a single theta
cycle, and that the emergence of new perceptual experiences may
be time locked to a particular phase of ongoing cortical theta
rhythms.”
There is evidence that the amplitude of prestimulus oscillations
in the alpha range also signiﬁcantly affects the perceptual outcome.
Van Dijk et al. (2008) found that contrast-discrimination ability is
modulated by prestimulus alpha power: an increase in posterior
alpha power correlates with a decrease in discrimination ability.
By directly stimulating visual area via short transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS), Romei et al. (2010) tested whether oscillation
in the alpha band causally shapes perception, relative to control
stimulations in the theta and beta bands: they found that occipital
and parietal TMS at alpha frequency impairs target visibility in
the visual ﬁeld contralateral to the stimulated hemisphere and
enhanced it ipsilaterally.
It still remains to be deﬁned which parameter of neural oscil-
lations – amplitude, phase consistency, or phase coupling –
predicts periodicity in perception better than others (Hanslmayr
et al., 2011). Likewise, it still remains unclear why different fre-
quencies correlate with different periodic perceptual phenomena.
Various hypotheses could be supported. For example, one can
think that the sampling frequency could vary as a function of the
kind of stimulation, synchronizing with stimulation, or that it
could evolve without synchronizing with the external world, as a
passive ongoing, random oscillation (Blais et al., 2013). Despite
all these open questions, however, the bulk of current studies
clearly points to the idea of a discrete sampling of perceptual
processing.
LANGUAGE AND CONSCIOUS THINKING
There is no doubt that the human capacities that most apparently
involve an active construction process are language and conscious
thinking. Language allows us to combine the single words and
thus convey vastly, literally inﬁnite new meanings and conscious
experiences. The power of language as a unique and special-
ized tool in connecting objects and events is exempliﬁed by the
strong connection between language and the ability to encode and
represent the order of discrete elements occurring in a sequence
(sequential learning; Conway and Christiansen, 2001). Likewise,
conscious thinking develops and evolves thanks to the combi-
nation of ideas, concepts, images, memories etc. As Baumeister
and Masicampo (2010, p. 956) observe: “conscious thinking and
speech involve a process of actively combining concepts to make
something that may have additional, unforeseen, newly emergent
properties.”
As extensively showed by the works of linguists, logicians, and
philosophers, the combinatorial property of language and con-
scious thinking relies on some speciﬁc relational units, whose
function is to tie together two or more semantic elements, be
they simple words, other relational units, complex thoughts,
or else. Scholars have variously identiﬁed and termed these
relational units. Sapir (1921) named them “relational con-
cepts” and classiﬁed them as concrete and pure. Ceccato (1972;
see also Ceccato and Zonta, 1980) termed them “correlators.”
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Linguistically, correlators are designated by prepositions, con-
junctions, cases (genitive, dative, etc.) and the implicit correlator
(Benedetti, 2011). Other examples of correlators are the mathe-
matical and logical operators. As Benedetti’s (2009, 2011) in-depth
analysis shows, correlators are themselves constituted by sequences
of elemental mental operations (among which those of attention
play a key role) that are assembled and chunked together by means
of working memory and procedural memory. The assembling
and chunking processes are supposed to be supported by anal-
ogous processes at the neurophysiological level within the nested
hierarchy of brain operational architecture (Benedetti et al., 2010;
Fingelkurts et al., 2010, 2013).
The constructive character of language is further evidenced by
its intrinsic periodicities. Speech is not produced in a continu-
ous, uninterrupted ﬂow but in spurts. Spurts reﬂect not only a
biological necessity (that is, the speaker’s need to replace the air
that he expels from his lungs when he produces speech sounds)
but also the basic functional segmentations of discourse. Chafe
(1994) refers to these segments of language as “intonation units.”
Intonation units, whose size averages one to four words, can be
identiﬁed on the basis of a variety of criteria, among which are
pauses or breaks in timing, acceleration and deceleration, changes
in overall pitch level, etc. Each intonation unit “verbalizes a small
amount of information which, it is plausible to suppose, is part of
the speaker’s model of reality on which his or her consciousness is
focused at that moment. In a socially interactive situation it is the
portion on which the speaker intends that the listener’s conscious-
ness be focused as a result of hearing the intonation unit. This
limited activation allows a person to interact with the surround-
ing world in a maximally productive way, for it would hardly be
useful to activate everything a person knew at once” (Chafe, 1994,
ibid., p. 29).
Similarly, Duncan (2013) explains the combinatorial nature of
human thought and, more in general, of cognition as the most
appropriate and adaptive answer to the complex problems posed
by the environment. It allows us to ﬂexibly address very com-
plex problems through the solution of simpler sub-problems. As
made clear by Artiﬁcial Intelligence studies, the most effective
way of solving complex problems is by decomposing them into
simpler components (see also Fingelkurts et al., 2012). If all the
aspects of a problem were considered at once, the search space
of possible alternative solutions would simply be too large and
unconstrained, yielding toomany concurrent, suboptimal choices.
“Effective cognition requires a series of selections from this space,
each deﬁning a subproblem of relevant inputs, actions, and poten-
tial achievements. Often these will be organized hierarchically, so
that each subgoal or task is divided further into subgoals of its
own” (Duncan, 2013, ibid., p. 36).
THE UNDERLYING MECHANISMS OF CONSTRUCTIVE
PROCESSES: ATTENTION AND WORKING MEMORY
As we have seen, disparate forms of consciousness such as
time travel, perception, language, and conscious thinking are
all based on an active construction process. As revealed by
research reviewed in the previous sections, this construction
process is implemented at various levels and underpinned by
various mechanisms. Given the commonality and close relations
between these forms of consciousness (language inﬂuences per-
ception and vice versa, conscious thinking and language show
extensive commonalities, mental time travel is heavily based on
perceived objects and events), it is legitimate to ask whether
the various forms of consciousness are underpinned by a com-
mon construction process or, at least, whether the construc-
tive processes underpinning them are based on some common
mechanisms.
My analysis (Marchetti, 2010) reveals that (1) different forms
of consciousness are produced by different construction processes,
and (2) two mechanisms implement the different construction
processes that underpin most of the different forms of conscious-
ness: these two mechanisms are attention and working memory.
Attention ensures the selection of basic elements (or pieces of
information); working memory ensures that the selected ele-
ments are maintained active during processing and assembled.
Various forms of consciousness result from the different ways
that attention and working memory operate, that is, from the
different ways of selecting, maintaining and assembling basic
elements.
Some form of attention is always necessary to produce con-
sciousness (Bor and Seth, 2012; Marchetti, 2012), even though the
former does not always produce conscious outcomes. Working
memory, while being necessary for most of our conscious expe-
riences, does not seem to be always necessary: very simple and
basic perceptions, but also more complex forms of perception
involving top-down attention control, do not require working
memory. Kane et al. (2006) showed that even in contexts (such
as command search task) in which subjects have to endogenously
control visual attention by moving it strategically though search
arrays, the high- and low- working memory subjects performed
equivalently: that is, even visual search tasks that present minimal
demands to actively maintain or update goal-relevant informa-
tion, but which are still difﬁcult and involve top-down attention
control, are independent of working memory.
The combined working of attention and working memory is
necessary to produce most of our conscious experiences. However,
attention and working memory are not always sufﬁcient: most
forms of consciousness also need other components, such as long
term memory, semantic memory, sense-organs, and somatosen-
sory organs, and what I call the schema of self (Marchetti,
2010).
Before examining how attention and working memory imple-
ment construction processes, I will ﬁrstly present evidence that
attention operates in a periodic, pulse-like manner, thus pro-
viding a plausible explanation for the periodicities observed in
perceptions and language, as well as for the selections performed
in conscious thinking and time travel. Secondly, I will brieﬂy
consider the neurophysiological bases of working memory, and
exemplify the role it plays in a form of consciousness, episodic
future thought.
ATTENTION
Psychologists have long studied attention as a mechanism capable
of coping with the limits of our sensory, perceptual and mem-
ory systems in managing the ﬂow of information with which
we are constantly confronted. By allowing for the selection of
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the information, attention reduces the input to a manageable
amount: it isolates and ampliﬁes pieces of information, which
can be variously combined to yield theoretically inﬁnite chains
of constructs. As observed by VanRullen et al. (2007), overt peri-
odic sampling of the environment is a ubiquitous property of
sensory systems (saccades in vision, sniffs in olfaction, whisker
movements in rat somatosensation, and even electrolocation in
the electric ﬁsh) and attention might have evolved from these peri-
odic processes as a more economical means of covertly sampling
endogenous representations.
Moreover, as argued by Duncan (2013, p. 36), attention proves
to be an effective tool in dealing with the complex problems
posed by the environment: in fact, it allows for the segmen-
tation of the ﬂow of information into “attentional episodes,”
each episode admitting into consideration only the contents of
momentary, focused subproblems. More speciﬁcally, attentional
discrete processing has various advantages from a purely com-
putational point of view. According to Buschman and Miller
(2010), restricting computations to discrete windows of time
would: (a) ensure that informative spikes occur with the temporal
precision that is both necessary for integration by downstream
neurons and for spike-timing dependent plasticity; (b) act to
stabilize and organize the neural network and its computations:
periods of inhibition may act to “reset” the network to a base
state, effectively limiting the number of states that neurons could
obtain; (c) allow for easier coordination of processing within
and between brain regions, by providing a speciﬁc moment at
which information must be available for computation in a spe-
ciﬁc region, and at which the outcome of the computation is
available.
Finally, the attentional selection process has the side effect of
creating new experiential dimensions on top of the ones from
which they originate. By selecting and combining otherwise unre-
lated elements, we can imagine and simulate new events, scenarios
and conditions that we would have never consciously experi-
enced if we had not been endowed with selective and constructive
capacities. As observed by Baumeister and Masicampo (2010,
p. 958), the full power of human consciousness consists in using
the mental capacity for constructing sequential thoughts to con-
duct simulations during wakefulness, without relying on sensory
input.
Although the working of attention can be theoretically con-
ceived as an uninterrupted, continuous process, which rapidly
switches between different targets, evidence seems to favor the
hypothesis that attention operates in a periodic, pulse-like man-
ner. VanRullen et al. (2007) found that attention, even when
focused on a single target location, samples information peri-
odically like a blinking spotlight. Moreover, by analyzing the
correlation between detection performance for attended and unat-
tended stimuli and the phase of ongoing EEG oscillations, Busch
and VanRullen (2010) showed that detection performance for
attended stimuli actually ﬂuctuated over time along with the phase
of spontaneous oscillations in the θ (≈7 Hz) frequency band
just before stimulus onset. This ﬂuctuation was absent for unat-
tended stimuli. This pattern of results suggests that attention in
fact exerts its facilitative effect on perception in a periodic fash-
ion. The alpha phase plays a crucial role in the attentional blink
phenomenon (Hanslmayr et al., 2011). Doesburg et al.’s (2008)
ﬁndings support the view that gamma-band synchronization
is the mechanism that implements the selective properties of
attention, its integrative properties, and the special relationship
between attention and consciousness. Landau and Fries’ (2012)
study shows that selective attention samples stimuli in a rhythmic
way. Further evidence of the link between attention and peri-
odic brain processes is provided by studies in which oscillatory
brain responses are entrained by periodic stimulation (Jones et al.,
2002).
An interesting theoretical frameworkhas beenproposed by Fin-
gelkurts and Fingelkurts (in press) as to the neural mechanisms of
attention. Fingelkurts et al. (2009,2010,2013) conceptualize atten-
tion within their theory of the operational architectonics (OA) of
brain and mind functioning. According to this theory, involuntary
(bottom-up) attention arises as a result of self-organized forma-
tion of neuronal assemblies whose operations are divided by rapid
transients (so called RTPs in the brain oscillations) that signify
the breakpoints of attention leading to an attentional disengage-
ment, shift, and/or allocation to a new operation. Fingelkurts and
Fingelkurts (in press) further suggest that the duration of these
operations is determined by external stimuli and modulated by
arousal as well as affective reinforcement. Voluntary (top-down)
attention emerges as a result of binding of multiple operations
responsible for sensory percepts or motor programs in a context-
dependent way as a function of a saliency, prior knowledge and
expectancies. During this process, the ever-changing and multi-
form stream of cognition and conscious experiences is somehow
“frozen” and “classiﬁed,” thus leading to the phenomenological
experience of acts or moments of focused attention in which
our consciousness is kept focused as a mental magnifying lens
at the attended object or scene. According to Fingelkurts and
Fingelkurts (in press), the skill to voluntarily focus attention
on a speciﬁc image, object or thought is guided by a spe-
ciﬁc fronto-parietal operational module (OM) that serves as an
order parameter and determines which particular OM of cortical
dynamics (synchronized spatial-temporal pattern of brain activ-
ity) should be reinforced at any given moment of time in order
to present a particular image, object or thought in the focus of
attention.
Finally, it shouldbenoted that the periodic nature of attentional
processing is also visible at wider temporal scales: spontaneous
eyeblinks, which occur 15–20 times per minute on average, are
closely correlated to attentional processing in that they tend to
occur at breakpoints of attention, such as the end of a sentence
while reading, a pause by the speaker while listening to a speech,
and implicit breakpoints while viewing videos. This close corre-
lation has led Nakano et al. (2013, p. 702) to hypothesize that
“eyeblinks are actively involved in the process of attentional dis-
engagement during cognitive behavior by momentarily activating
the default-mode network while deactivating the dorsal attention
network.”
All this evidence points, on the one hand, to the periodic
nature of attention and, on the other hand, to the close correla-
tion between the periodicity of attention and brain oscillations.
Above all Busch and VanRullen’s (2010) shows two important
facts about attention. Firstly, attention has a natural or default
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periodicity (around 7 Hz): it samples information even when only
a single location has to be monitored. Secondly, attention cannot
be allocated at any given time but only at speciﬁc phases of an
oscillatory cycle. It is therefore highly plausible to theorize that
attention is the product of, or is underpinned by (one or some of)
such brain oscillations.
WORKING MEMORY
In order to maintain and combine the elements selected and
isolated by attention, a speciﬁc mechanism is required. This
mechanism is working memory.
Working memory is generally considered as a system that helps
to simultaneously manipulate information over a short period and
update it inmemory. More speciﬁcally, as highlightedbyUnsworth
andEngle (2007), workingmemory is needed tomaintain new and
novel information in a heightened state of activity, and to correctly
discriminate between relevant and irrelevant information with
regard to the task to be performed, by preventing the interference
of automatic tendencies and routines. In this sense, working mem-
ory is “not directly about remembering per se, but instead reﬂects
a more general ability to control attention and exert top-down
control over cognition” (Broadway and Engle, 2011b, p. 1).
The role of working memory in ﬂexibly and freely combin-
ing content elements into new structures is explicitly theorized by
Oberauer (2009). According to Oberauer (2009), working mem-
ory is a system that is able (among other functions) to build and
maintain new structural representations by establishing and hold-
ing temporary bindings between contents (objects, events, words)
and contexts (such as positions in a generic cognitive spatial
or coordinate system, or argument variables in structure tem-
plates). Neurophysiological studies have started to elucidate this
system. Experimental ﬁndings using the OA methodology in EEG
analysis clearly point to the fact that the binding of sensory fea-
ture representations into phenomenal (subjective)“objects,” active
encoding, maintenance and retrieval of these mental “objects”
during working memory are critically dependent on dynamic
millisecond-range synchronization of multiple operations per-
formed by local neuronal assemblies that operate on different
temporal (oscillations) scales nested within the same operational
hierarchy (Fingelkurts et al., 2010; Monto, 2012). In particular,
medium life-span OMs of brain activity (that “cover” certain cor-
tical areas) seem necessary to achieve successful memorization
(Fingelkurts et al., 1998, 2003). Indeed, although memory encod-
ing, retention and retrieval often share common regions of the
cortex, the operational synchrony of these areas is always unique
and presented as a mosaic of nested OMs for each stage of the
short-term memory task (Fingelkurts et al., 1998, 2003). When
there are too few or too many OMs and their life-span is either
too short or too long, then such conditions lead to cessation of
efﬁcient memorization.
By supporting arbitrary bindings between virtually any content
with any context, working memory enables the compositionality
of thought, and the creation of a theoretically unlimited number
of different ideas. The binding of contents and contexts allows
for the arrangement and representation of objects and events in a
spatial and temporal coordinate system, as well as in some other
quantitative dimensions such as size, brightness, intelligence, etc.
Recent ﬁndings showing that working memory plays a role
in the construction of novel future events are provided by Hill
and Emery (2013). They started from the observation that, unlike
past episodic recall which requires reconstructing the elements
of a previously experienced event, future thought depends on
a novel recombination of episodic details into a hypothetical
event (Addis and Schacter, 2011). This requirement for a novel
recombination suggests that future event construction involves
additional cognitive and neural processes that are not as involved
in autobiographical memory reconstruction. Furthermore, the
observed involvement of both prefrontal and hippocampal regions
in the construction of future events (Addis et al., 2007), as well as
the involvement of the episodic buffer of working memory in
prospective mind wandering (Baird et al., 2011) and in recom-
bining semantic personal information (D’Argembeau and Mathy,
2011) and information from multiple modalities (Szpunar et al.,
2009), suggests that a combination of executive andmemory bind-
ing functions may contribute to this novel constructive process.
This points to a potential cognitive role for working memory in
imagining future episodes, above and beyond the contributions
provided by access to the autobiographical database. Using a com-
posite score of working memory capacity (WMC),Hill and Emery
(2013) examined the extent to which residual working mem-
ory variance contributes to future thought while controlling for
autobiographical memory. Subjects had to complete simple and
complex measures of working memory and were cued to recall
autobiographical memories and imagine future autobiographi-
cal events consisting of various levels of speciﬁcity (i.e., ranging
from generic to increasingly speciﬁc and detailed events). They
found (1) that the ability to imagine personally relevant events
in the future is strongly related to autobiographical memory and
(2) that after controlling for autobiographical memory, residual
working memory variance independently predicts future episodic
speciﬁcity. That is, when imagining future events, working mem-
ory contributes to the construction of a single, coherent, future
events depiction.
It is interesting to note that what I propose to be the two
main underlying mechanisms of constructive processes – atten-
tion and working memory – interact so closely, and seem not to
be able to operate without each other, that some scholars have
put forward models explicitly including either the former in the
latter (Engle, 2002; Oberauer, 2009), or the latter in the former
(Knudsen, 2007).
VARIOUSLY USING ATTENTION AND WORKING MEMORY
YIELDS VARIOUS CONSTRUCTION PROCESSES
In order to occur, any construction process requires the availability
of some basic elements to be assembled, and a mechanism that
allows for the assembly of these basic elements (Benedetti et al.,
2010; Fingelkurts et al., 2010, 2013). Regarding the construction
processes underpinning the various forms of consciousness, we
have seen that the basic elements are provided by attention, and
that their assembly is ensured by working memory.
Attention can be variously applied and used: it can be focused
internally or externally (Chun et al., 2011); it can be focused at
variable levels of size, being set either widely across a display of
objects or narrowly to the size of a single object (Jonides, 1983);
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it can be focused at variable levels of intensity (La Berge, 1983),
etc. Likewise, working memory can be variously used to perform
arithmetical operations, compare pieces of information, combine
items, etc. In some situations it is optimal to maintain as many
distinctive items as possible active in working memory, while in
some others it is optimal tomaintain only one item (Unsworth and
Engle, 2007). Some tasks may require a more intensive involve-
ment of the procedural part of working memory as compared to
the declarative part, while some others may require the opposite
(Oberauer, 2009), etc.
It is precisely the fact that both the selection of basic ele-
ments and their assembly can be performed in various ways, that
allows various construction processes to be performed, thereby
obtaining various forms of consciousness. This parallels any
other construction process. Just as a house can be built using
bricks rather than stones or wood, so too conscious experiences
can be built using current information from the outer world
rather than information retrieved from memory. Likewise, just
as bricks can be assembled in order to build a corner rather than
a wall, so too information retrieved from memory can be com-
bined in order to imagine future events rather than to relive past
events.
This paper describes the constructive process that yields the
conscious experience of temporality. Therefore, I will speciﬁcally
focus on which operations attention and working memory per-
form in order to produce such a conscious experience. However, I
will also brieﬂy describe the operations of attention and working
memory involved in the construction of some other form of con-
sciousness, so as to provide a set of comparable analyses for future
empirical veriﬁcation.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF TEMPORAL EVENTS
If onewants to investigate how the construction of temporal events
occurs, one must necessarily start from the analysis of its most
basic manifestation: duration. The subjective experience of tem-
porality is fundamentally durational in nature, in the sense that
duration represents a prerequisite for the development of the other
important experiences that are usually conceived as being strictly
linked to time, such as the awareness of change, the experience of
succession, and the possibility of distinguishing past from present
and from future. Some researchers (Gibson, 1975, 1979; Lakoff
and Johnson, 1999) maintain the primacy of event detection over
duration: according to them, temporal experiencewould primarily
be, and derive from, the awareness of change exhibited by events
in the world. However, some facts clearly show that the experience
of time is not based on event comparison (for a detailed review,
see Evans, 2004). Firstly, we can experience the passage of time
whether there has actually been a change in the world-state or not,
as evidenced by situations of relative sensory-deprivation (such as
windowless, sound-proofed cells) in which subjects are still aware
of the passage of time. Secondly, the experience of duration is
independent of the nature of external events: the experience of
protracted duration can result from both states in which the stim-
ulus array is impoverished and events that, on the contrary, are
extremely rich in sense-perceptory terms.
How is then the experience of duration constructed? According
to my analysis (Marchetti, 2009a), an event or object assumes a
durational dimension when we devote, in an incremental man-
ner, part of our attention to the conscious experience of the
event or object. More speciﬁcally, the duration of a given event
is determined by the cumulative quantity of labor performed
by the portion of our attention (At) that is kept focused on the
conscious experience of the event. Since the event itself is con-
structed by means of another portion of one’s attention (Ae),
duration judgments can be considered equivalent to divided-
attention tasks, in which attention must be divided between
temporal and non-temporal information processing (Block and
Zakay, 2001; Zakay and Block, 2004). The labor performed by At
is cumulated thanks to working memory. The cumulative amount
of labor performed by At constitutes the basis on which the con-
scious experience of duration and more in general time-sensation
are anchored.
Some alternative explanations of the psychological phe-
nomenon of duration have been put forward, but have various
drawbacks. A very well-known alternative is the internal-clock
model (Treisman, 1963; Wearden et al., 1998; Wearden, 2001). As
an example of internal-clock models, let us consider the “scalar
expectancy theory” (SET) proposed by Wearden (2001). The SET
model is composed of three parts: a pacemaker-accumulator, a
memory system, and a comparison or decision process. To under-
stand how such a model operates, consider the problem of timing
the duration of a stimulus t1 through comparison with the dura-
tion of another stimulus, t2 (whether, for example, they are equal
or different in length). Onset of stimulus t1 causes the pulses,
that is, the “ticks” of the inner clock, to ﬂow from the pacemaker
to the accumulator. Offset of stimulus causes the interruption
of the ﬂow of pulses: the accumulation of pulses by the accu-
mulator is then stopped. The memory system allows duration
representations to be stored either in a long-term memory or in a
short-term memory. Thanks to the memory system, the duration
of the ﬁrst stimulus t1 can be stored until after the second one, t2,
has been presented: a comparison between the two stimuli is then
possible. Finally, t1 and t2 are compared and a response can be
delivered.
Internal-clock models can certainly account for some phe-
nomena, such as the differences in judging the duration of
auditory stimuli versus visual ones. However, they face various
kinds of problems. Generally speaking, internal-clock models
seem inadequate to explain the inherent inaccuracy of human
duration judgments, that is, the fact that organisms provided
with such a precise mechanism as an internal clock very often
exhibit inaccurate timing behaviors (Block, 1990). Methodolog-
ically speaking, internal-clock models present many drawbacks
(Block, 2003), among which the facts that most of the evi-
dence comes from a few relatively simple paradigms (such as
the peak procedure and the bisection task), from studies in
which animals estimate the duration of a single stimulus or
an interval between two stimuli, and from experiments during
which no external stimuli are presented internal-clock models
cannot readily explain the effects of attention on psychological
time; many of the ﬁndings that internal-clock models explain
are generic, that is, they are not unique to the time dimension.
The same ﬁndings of internal-clock models could be explained
by models composed of very basic modules, such as a perceptual
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system, without resorting to an additional component such as the
pacemaker.
Additionally, internal-clock models face the problem of the
individuation of the internal clock (Ornstein, 1969). Apparently,
human beings are provided with a number of different mech-
anisms that could all equally and ﬁnely act as internal clocks:
heart rate, breathing rate, cellular metabolism, toe-nail growth,
alpha rhythm, etc. What are the criteria for judging a given phys-
iological process to be an internal “chronometer”? Why could
hair growth or toe-nail growth rather than alpha rhythm not
be designated as the internal time keeper? Richelle et al. (1985,
p. 90) go so far as to pose the provocative question: “Why
not admit that there are as many clocks as there are behaviors
exhibiting timing properties?” This admission deﬁnitely con-
ﬁrms the uselessness and lack of parsimony of the notion of
the internal clock for a general analysis and explanation of time
experience.
Finally, the explanation put forward by internal-clock models
implies a fallacious circularity (Marchetti, 2010). Merely naming
a given process as a “time keeper” or “internal clock” cannot auto-
matically sufﬁce to appoint it as the mechanism responsible for
time experience. A counter or a timer, like any clock, can only
provide the raw material necessary for counting. But there must
be someone who performs the counting. As Vicario argues: “The
clock says the hour only when we look at it” (Vicario, 2005, p. 165).
It is we who assign the physical mechanism – whether it is a pendu-
lum, the sun, a clock, or something else – the capacity to trace the
ﬂowing of our conscious experiences and to estimate their dura-
tion. To realize this, just consider the fact that a clock which has
stopped or is not working, despite not measuring any actual time,
can still be interpreted by an observer as telling the time!
Another possible explanation accounts for time experience
in terms of the passage from one conscious state to another:
that is, the fact that an event that is being experienced now,
becomes no longer present, and passes into the domain of mem-
ory. The experience of the passage of time would be produced
by the experience of change of conscious state and the phe-
nomenal differences that exist between the various conscious
states (the experience of remembering an object is phenome-
nally different from the experience of actually perceiving it). By
taking into account the experiences implied by the change of
conscious state, this explanation certainly captures part of the
origin of the experience of time. However, it still remains at
a very phenomenological and surface level, without investigat-
ing the possible neurophysiological mechanisms underpinning
the phenomenon. In fact, the experience of the change of
conscious state, and of the differences between the various
conscious states, can be explained by and reduced to a more
basic level: the working of attention and working memory.
Actually, in order for one to realize that “something-that-is-
present-now”has become“something-that-is-no-longer-present,”
one must ﬁrst isolate the two experiences (the “something-that-
is-present-now” and the “something-that-is-no-longer-present”)
and then compare them. That is, one must ﬁrst attentionally
focus on them separately, and then keep one of them active in
working memory so as to allow for the comparison with the
other.
Let us now see what evidence could support my hypothesis
about the involvement of attention and working memory in the
construction of the experience of duration.
EVIDENCE OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF ATTENTIONAL AND WORKING
MEMORY IN THE EXPERIENCE OF DURATION
Evidence of the attentional basis of the experience of duration
is conﬁrmed by a number of empirical ﬁndings. Experiments
in which subjects are asked to prospectively1 judge the duration
of the time period in which they had to perform a certain task,
reveal that the judged time decreases linearly with the increased
processing demands of the non-temporal information, and that
experienced duration increases to the extent that subjects can
allocate more attentional resources to the ﬂow of time itself
(Hicks et al., 1976, 1977; Brown, 1985; Coull et al., 2004). In
prospective time judgments, negative high-arousal stimuli, induc-
ing a stronger attentional response, are overestimated compared
with positive high-arousal stimuli, inducing a weaker attentional
response (Angrilli et al., 1997). Likewise, Tse et al. (2004) found
that the engagement of attention by an unexpected event increases
the rate of information processing brought to bear on a stim-
ulus, thus inducing an overestimation of the duration of the
stimulus.
A conﬁrmation of the role played by attention in construct-
ing temporal experience also comes indirectly from experiments
in which subjects are asked to retrospectively2 judge the duration
of events. Such experiments show that subjects remember a time
period as being longer in duration to the extent that there are
greater context changes (such as a variation in background stimuli
or interoceptive stimuli, the psychological context, the process-
ing context, etc.; Block and Zakay, 2001; Zakay and Block, 2004).
Since, as Glicksohn (2001), observes retrospective time estimation
entails reperceiving (imaginally) the event, it is conceivable that
the retrospective judgment of time is determined (at least in part)
by what would have been a prospective judgment of time. There-
fore, the phenomena observed in retrospective time estimation
can also be ascribed to attention (for a more detailed discussion,
see Marchetti, 2010).
Finally, it should be noted that attention has been found to
also determine other important aspects of temporal experience
not principally related to the experience of duration. For example,
the phenomenon known as prior-entry shows that when a person
attends to a stimulus, he/she perceives it as having occurred earlier
in time than it would if he or she was not attending to it (Shore
et al., 2001; Shore and Spence, 2004).
As concerns the role of working memory in the experience
of duration, to my knowledge there is no direct evidence as yet
of its involvement in the terms that are explained in this work.
Broadway and Engle (2011a,b) showed, in a series of tempo-
ral reproduction tasks, the close relationship between WMC and
duration judgment. Using naturally occurring individual differ-
ences in WMC to mimic load manipulations, Broadway and Engle
(2011b) found that low-WMC individuals are less sensitive than
1That is subjects are alerted in advance that time judgments will be required.
2That is subjects do not know in advance that they will later be asked to judge the
duration of a time period.
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high-WMC to identifying the longer of two comparison inter-
vals across a range of absolute durations and duration differences.
That is, individual differences in WMC predict differences in tem-
poral discrimination. As Broadway and Engle explain, WMC is
necessary for performing temporal reproduction tasks because a
person would need to encode and maintain access to two dis-
tinct representations of elapsed time in an ongoing dynamic
manner for comparison and temporal judgment. Therefore, fur-
ther experiments are needed to verify what my analysis shows,
that is, that working memory is necessary to consciously expe-
rience duration per se, independently of any possible duration
judgment.
Several models and empirical ﬁndings point speciﬁcally to a
cumulative build-up mechanism as a possible basis for the expe-
rience of duration (for a review, see Wittmann, 2013). It should
be noted however that none of them explicitly refer to working
memory as the main mechanism responsible for integrating infor-
mation. According to the dual klepsydra model by Wackermann
and Ehm (2006), time duration is represented by the states of
inﬂow-outﬂow units, which function as leaky integrators. The
state of the integrator is a non-linear climbing function of physi-
cal time. Craig (2009) theorizes that the anterior insula integrates
representations of body states with cognitive and motivational
states, creating a series of emotional moments, each of which is
a coherent representation of all feelings experienced at that time.
The experience of duration would develop from the integration
of a series of states over time. Craig’s model suggests that the sub-
jective dilation of time during periods of high emotional salience
results from the high rate of salience accumulation, which would
rapidly ﬁll up global emotional moments.
From an empirical point of view, neurophysiological ﬁnd-
ings in primates and humans show that climbing neural activity
in several brain regions is related to the experience of duration
(Niki and Watanabe, 1979; Lebedev et al., 2008; Mita et al., 2009;
Wittmann et al., 2010, 2011; Casini and Vidal, 2011; Merchant
et al., 2011). For example, functional fMRI experiments in which
subjects have to temporally reproduce acoustic stimuli of vari-
ous lengths (Wittmann et al., 2010, 2011), show an accumulating
pattern of activity within left and right dorsal posterior insula
and superior temporal cortex during the encoding phase of the
task (with the activity peaking at the end of the interval), and
an accumulating activation in the anterior insula, medial frontal
and inferior frontal cortex in the reproduction phase of the task
(with the activity peaking shortly before the button press indi-
cating the reproduced length by the subject). As Merchant et al.
(2013) observe, the ubiquitous increases or decreases in cell dis-
charge rate as a function of time across different timing tasks and
brain areas, suggest that ramping activity is a fundamental element
of the timing mechanism.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
As we have seen, we have the capacity to experience the same event
as occurring either in the present, past, or future (Nyberg et al.,
2010). What construction process makes this possible?
According to my analysis, a temporal event can acquire a past
or future dimension if it is placed in a temporal coordinate system
having the “present” as its reference point.
As many scholars have highlighted (Revonsuo, 2006; Droege,
2009; Dresp-Langley and Durup, 2012; Fingelkurts and Fin-
gelkurts,2014), the temporal dimensionof“present”is constitutive
of conscious experiences3. Without such a dimension, there would
be no conscious experiences as we currently live them: it is the ref-
erence point that allows for the construction of past and future. As
Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts (2014) state: “even remembering the
past images and planning the future events cannot be performed
other than in the present moment and in relation to current state
of affairs.” There can be cases of conscious experiences lacking
the characteristic of time (as well as of for-me-ness) such as those
achieved by trained subjects who practice meditation. However,
these cases are very uncommon, and can be attained either in
exceptional cases or via extended practice.
Once a temporal event is placed in a temporal coordinate system
where the “present” acts a reference point, it can be related to this
reference point, and consequently assume either a past or a future
property.
How can a temporal coordinate system be constructed? It can
be obtained from the most elementary and primitive experience
of time, that is, duration. As we saw, the experience of dura-
tion is based on the cumulative quantity of labor performed by
the portion of attention (At) that is kept focused on the con-
scious experience of the event. Being cumulative, the quantity of
labor performed by At can only increase. This makes it possible
to arrange events in a univocal and irreversible way, which is pre-
cisely the condition necessary to construct a temporal coordinate
system made of “past,”“present,” and“future.”Generally speaking,
if we consider for example that a given event X can be associated
with a certain amount of labor performed by At , an event Y that is
associated with a higher amount of labor performed by At appears
to us to happen “after” X, whereas an event Z that is associated
with a lower amount of labor performed by At appears to hap-
pen “before” X. That is, once X, Y, and Z are assigned a speciﬁc
location in a cognitive coordinate system characterized by one-
dimensionality and irreversibility, they are ordered according to
the temporal dimension. More speciﬁcally, if event X occurs in the
“present,” Z will be experienced as occurring in the “past” and Y as
occurring in the “future.”
The existence of past and future makes it possible to construct
the conscious experiences of remembering past events and imag-
ining future events. As suggested by Ceccato and Zonta’s (1980)
work, and more speciﬁcally by phenomenological analysis (see
Thompson, 2008), the subjective experience of remembering an
event derives from adding the temporal dimension of past to the
event. In remembering, one lives experiences as having occurred
in the “past” and not as occurring now. In a similar way, the sub-
jective experience of imagining a future event derives from adding
the temporal dimension of future to the event. The operation of
adding a (past or future) temporal dimension to an event is per-
formed thanks to working memory, which binds the event to a
position in the temporal coordinate system (Oberauer, 2009).
3The dimension of “present” is not the only constitutive feature of consciousness.
Some other dimensions have also been identiﬁed, such as the dimensions of “here”
and “for-me-ness,” that is, the fact that of all of our experiences are characterized
implicitly by a quality of mineness: see Revonsuo (2006) and Gallagher and Zahavi
(2008).
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 880 | 10
Marchetti Attention, working memory and temporal experiences
Empirical evidence supporting this analysis is still partial and
indirect, and a speciﬁc investigation must be performed in order
to validate the analysis. As we have seen, Hill and Emery’s (2013)
work conﬁrms the role played by working memory in mental
time travel, speciﬁcally when imagining future events. The close
link between attention and the conscious experience of reliv-
ing past events was reviewed by De Brigard (2012). Behavioral
studies using divided attention paradigms show that when inter-
nal attention (Chun et al., 2011) to material-congruent deeply
encoded information is disrupted during retrieval, recollection is
signiﬁcantly impaired (Fernandes and Moscovitch, 2000; Hicks
and Marsh, 2000). Likewise, neuropsychological studies show
that under free-recall conditions, patients with parietal cortex
damage, which usually impairs attention to external stimuli,
tend to retrieve less episodic perceptual details and lower lev-
els of vividness in their recollections from their autobiographical
memories relative to both cued-recall and healthy controls (Berry-
hill et al., 2007). Davidson et al. (2008) also show that patients
with parietal lesions produce a reduced number of “remember”
responses, which are associated with increased subjective expe-
rience of recollection, relative to both “know” responses and
controls.
To summarize the analysis I have put forward: the con-
scious experience of duration is produced by two (non-conscious)
mechanisms: attention and working memory. The conscious
experiences of past, present and future are in turn built on the
conscious experience of duration. By adding the temporal dimen-
sions of past and future to an event, it is possible to subjectively
experience that event as remembered or occurring in the future,
respectively.
This kind of explanation of temporal experience does not
rely on mechanisms purposefully designed to process time
(such as an “internal-clock”), but rather on mechanisms (atten-
tion and working memory) that have other, more basic and
general-purpose functions, not necessarily related to the encod-
ing of duration and time. As such, the circularity implied in many
other explanations of temporal experience (Marchetti, 2009a) is
avoided.
HOW THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS WORKS: A COMPARISON WITH
SOME OTHER FORMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
As we have seen, the attentional selection of basic elements and
their assembly by means of working memory can be performed
in various ways. This allows various construction processes to
be performed, thereby obtaining various forms of consciousness.
Here I will brieﬂy show how variously using attention and working
memory yields different forms of consciousness (see Table 1 for
an overview). In this way, I intend to provide an initial set of
comparable analyses that can be used to empirically verify my
analyses.
The conscious experience of space
The conscious experience of space is primarily based on bodily
movements (Berthoz, 2000; Morris, 2004). However, bodily move-
ments, albeit necessary, are not sufﬁcient (Marchetti, 2009b). The
conscious experience of space also requires that: (a) attention is
internally applied to prorioceptors and the vestibular system in
order to isolate and bring to consciousness the single perceptions
entailed by movement. External attention is also required to build
some conscious experiences of space (Berthoz, 2000); (b) work-
ing memory assemblies these single perceptions, by keeping them
present in an incremental way. It is this latter operation that allows
for the construction of a “sequence” or “succession” of percep-
tions, which is the basis for the formation of two-dimensional
constructs, such as “path,”“line,” and “distance.”
The need for working memory (in addition to bodily move-
ment) in the construction of the conscious experience of space
is evident when comparing the different conscious experiences of
Table 1 |The different involvement of attention and working memory in some forms of consciousness.
Form of consciousness Form of attention Focus of attention Activity performed by working memory (WM)
Duration Internal attention Conscious experience of the event whose
duration is judged
Integration of attentional states
Episodic memory Internal attention The event located in the past Supporting the arrangement of the event in a
temporal coordinate system
Episodic future thought Internal attention The event located in the future Supporting the arrangement of the event in a
temporal coordinate system
Space Internal and external
attention
Products of the activity performed by
proprioceptors, vestibular system and
sense-organs
Integration of attentional states
Language Internal attention, shared
attention, etc.
Semantic memory, short term- memory,
interlocutors
Supporting relational units that variously combine
semantic elements. The level of WM involvement
varies according to sentence structure and length
Thought Internal attention Representational systems, frames, speciﬁc
domain knowledge
Supporting (conscious and unconscious) operators
that variously combine elements of various nature.
The level of WM involvement is high
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“movement” and “line” (or “path”) we have when performing the
same act. For example, move your index ﬁnger slowly. Now, look
at the tip of the ﬁnger while the ﬁnger moves, and consider it as a
moving object. Next, repeat the movement and consider the path
or line drawn by the tip of the ﬁnger. You will notice that in the
former case you will simply follow the tip of the ﬁnger, maybe
anticipating its direction, but without keeping track of the posi-
tions previously occupied by it; on the contrary, in the latter case
you will follow the tip of the ﬁnger by constantly keeping track of
the positions it occupied, moment after moment, since it started
moving.
Language and conscious thinking
Language allows us to variously and, theoretically, endlessly com-
bine meanings. This combinatorial power is made possible by
relational units (such as conjunctions and prepositions: Sapir,
1921; Ceccato, 1972; Ceccato and Zonta, 1980; Benedetti, 2006,
2009, 2011), which, tying together two or more semantic elements
(simple words, other relational units, complex thoughts, etc.),
allow for the construction of correlational networks (or minimal
unit of linguistic thought).
As shown by Benedetti’s (2006), analysis the production of
correlational networks is made possible by working memory and
procedural memory. These two forms of memory, albeit neces-
sary, are not sufﬁcient. Theoretically, correlational networks can
be inﬁnite. However, the well-known limits of working memory
constrain this possibility. In fact, sentences have a limited length
and are separated by semicolons, full stops, pauses, etc. At full
stops, working memory stops being loaded, and what has been
present in it up to that moment, must be in some way stored in
a summarized form in a short-term memory. Pronouns have the
function of reloading into working memory what has been stored
in short-term memory.
It should be noted that, compared and contrary to the expe-
riences of time and space, language does not speciﬁcally require
that working memory cumulates attentional states. In language,
working memory has the primary and most general function of
supporting relational units in (variously) combining semantic ele-
ments. Moreover, language speciﬁcally needs the involvement of
semantic memory, which is only rarely, or indirectly, involved
when constructing temporal and spatial experiences. Additionally,
language deeply requires other forms of attention, such as shared
attention (Tomasello, 1999, 2004; Oakley, 2009).
Language and the kind of thought it entails (linguistic or cor-
relational thought: Ceccato and Zonta, 1980; Benedetti, 2011) can
be considered a speciﬁc subset of conscious thinking (Marchetti,
2010). In many cases, we have dynamic and evolving visuo-spatial
thought (such as when we think, for example, about a ﬂower that
opens), or forms of thoughts involving other senses. Moreover,
most of the times, thoughts do not just combine elements, but
produce results, such as when a solution suddenly pops into one’s
mind after having searched for it for a while. Generally speaking,
conscious thinking requires operators other than just the rela-
tional units involved by language: these operators should allow,
for example, for the transformation of the object of thought, or
the production of new conscious experiences from earlier ones, or
the comparison of elements.
Therefore, conscious thinking, compared to language, some-
times requires a deeper involvement of working memory (such as
when evolving representations are produced), and the presence of
dedicated (and usually unconscious) frames, representational and
operational systems that are not strictly required by language (such
as those that allow one to draw inferences, or make decisions).
A ﬁnal consideration should be made about the empirical ver-
iﬁcation of the analyses I have put forward here and elsewhere
(Marchetti, 1997, 2010). Generally speaking, it should be noted
that these analyses are particularly suited to be veriﬁed by an
empirical approach centered on the notion of operation and its
combinatorial power. In fact, my analyses describe in a sufﬁciently
detailed way what operations (that is, how basic elements are
assembled and combined) must be performed in order to obtain
certain forms of consciousness. As already shown in another paper
(Benedetti et al., 2010), the Fingelkurts brothers’ OA (Fingelkurts
and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2005; Fingelkurts et al., 2009, 2010, 2012,
2013) offers such an empirical approach. According to OA, sim-
ple cognitive operations that present some partial aspect of an
object/scene/concept or thought are presented in the brain by
local 3D-ﬁelds produced by discrete and transient neuronal assem-
blies, which can be recorded by an EEG. More complex operations
that constitute the whole object/scene or thought are brought into
existence by joint (synchronized) simple operations in the form
of coupled 3D-ﬁelds – so called OMs of varied complexity. OA
does not put forward speciﬁc analyses in operational terms of
phenomenological contents and forms. However, because of the
hierarchical organization implied by its theoretical framework,OA
is very suited to verify precisely this kind of analysis.
CONCLUSION
This article is an attempt to demonstrate that some of the most
important forms of consciousness – episodic memory, episodic
future thought, perception, language and conscious thinking – are
based on an active constructive process. Despite the fact that we
experience the world surrounding us as a continuous, seamless
ﬂow of information, many psychological and neurophysiologi-
cal observations reveal that information is actually extracted and
processed in distinct moments, similar to the snapshots of a
camera.
For most of the forms of consciousness to occur, a construc-
tion combining the various moments or snapshots is required.
The main plausible mechanisms implied in this construction pro-
cess are attention and working memory. Attention allows for the
selection of the basic elements to be assembled. Empirical evi-
dence shows that attention works on a period basis (around 7 Hz):
it samples information even when only a single location has to
be monitored. Working memory represents the mechanism that
allows for the assembly of the basic elements selected by attention,
by establishing and holding temporary bindings between contents
and contexts.
Both the selection of basic elements and their assembly can
be performed in various ways, thus allowing various construction
processes to be performed, thereby obtaining various forms of
consciousness.
Temporal experience is based on a speciﬁc kind of working
of attention and combination of attentional moments. Namely,
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the duration of a given event is determined by the cumulative
quantity of labor performed by the portion of our attention (At)
that is kept focused on the conscious experience of the event. The
labor performed by At is cumulated thanks to working memory.
The experience of duration provides the basis for the construc-
tion of the conscious experiences of past, present and future. By
adding the temporal dimensions of past and future to an event, it
is possible to subjectively experience that event as remembered or
occurring in the future.
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